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Abstract 
This thesis tests the validity of the 'constrained-state thesis' through an 
examination ofthe attempted liberalization of services in the European Union (EU).The 
'constrained-state thesis' (also known as the 'straightjacket thesis'), which emerged out 
of the "globalization-as-constraint school", claims that the state is no longer capable of 
effectively determining economic developmental strategies or economic policies. 
Viewed from this perspective, the state is no longer the locus of socio-economic power. 
The empirical evidence presented in this thesis does not support the argument that 
states are losing the ability to control the direction of national economic development. In 
the EU, Member States have largely retained the power to regulate the operation of 
services within their territory. Despite what seemed like an unstoppable movement 
towards liberalization ten years ago, little progress has been made towards achieving a 
truly open internal market for services. The Services Directive which will likely receive 
enough votes in Parliament this coming fall (2006), only provides legal certainty that 
service providers can temporarily operate outside their country of origin. It will not 
dramatically change the ability of Member States to control the delivery of services on 
their territory. 
In the case of services, Member States have largely retained their regulatory 
power. For sure, EU institutions will play a role in some service sectors that Member 
States have agreed are better regulated on an EU wide scale. However, states are still the 
dominant source of regulatory power when it comes to services in the EU. Domestic 
political and economic realities will ultimately determine the degree to which Member 
States give up power to EU institutions with respect to services. Member States have 
retained the ability to work with domestic stakeholders in the service sector to coordinate 
economic growth. Considering that service oriented jobs contribute more to GDP in 
developed countries than any other type of employment, Member States will continue to 
play a important role in determining 'who gets what'. 
The empirical evidence presented in this thesis also contradicts conventional 
wisdom that states will eventually be replaced by regional supranational economic 
institutions that pull member states towards a single economic model. We may see more 
regional economic supranational institutions. However, the evidence presented in this 
thesis suggests that if supranational organizations develop into types of confederal 
economic organizations that include democratic institutions (such as Parliament in the 
EU), institutional avenues are created through which the economic power of Member 
States can be protected. This is exactly what happened in the EU. Because Parliament has 
co-decision legislative power over the internal market, stakeholders lobbied Parliament to 
protect Member State's authority over services. 
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Introduction 
In the Consequences of Modernity, Anthony Giddens wrote that 'globalization' is 
"a term which must have a key position in the lexicon of the social sciences."1 Despite 
the realization of Gidden's proposition, globalization is a concept that is used rather 
loosely, more suggestively than with conceptual rigor. The debate surrounding 
globalization has also produced a whole range of theories that argue that the era of the 
'state' is over. Whether approached from a political, social or economic perspective, 
numerous theories of economic globalization predict the end of the 'state' as the 
organizing principle of the spatial organization of economic power. 
In particular, the 'constrained-state thesis' (also known as the 'straightjacket 
thesis'), which emerged out of the 'globalization-as-constraint school', claims that the 
state is no longer capable of effectively determining economic developmental strategies.2 
The 'constrained-state thesis' is a concept used by scholars to make a variety of 
arguments relating to the weakening of the state. All these arguments rest on the premise 
"that changes in the international political economy have radically restricted policy 
choice and forced policy shifts that play to the preferences of global investors and mobile 
corporations, rather than to the needs of the domestic political economy and its 
citizenry."3 According to the 'constrained-state thesis', states no longer control the 
movement and operation of capital, and hence of international financial markets, and 
multinational corporations (MNCs), which function according to the logic ofneoliberal 
1 Anthony Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 52. 
2 See Linda Weiss, ed., States in the Global Economy: Bringing Domestic Institutions Back In (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003), 1-7. Weiss is a critic of the 'constrained-state thesis'. 
3 Ibid., 3. 
1 
capitalism. Consequently, states must compete with other states in order to attract capital 
and the business ofMNCs and to do so they must adopt neoliberal policies. In other 
words, states must adopt policies that create the conditions that attract global economic 
actors, namely free trade, low levels of taxation, the free movement of capital, and little 
government interference in the economy. 
Viewed from this perspective, the state is no longer the "primary container of 
national socio-economic activity," and its role in determining 'who gets what' is 
continuously diminishing. 4 Economic globalization implies the existence of a set of 
processes and actors that can not be controlled by states because they operate outside the 
realm of the state. It is this claim which leads to the assertion that it is the nature of the 
global economic system (neoliberal capitalism) that determines economic policy in a 
globalized world. Domestic political and economic realities have little or no impact on 
state policies, because states have little or no control over the operation of the global 
economic system. 5 The implication of this argument is that protectionist policies or 
measures that hinder national economic integration with the global economy will 
ultimately lead to the stagnation of national economies. 
In the following pages the validity of the 'constrained-state thesis' is tested 
through an examination ofthe attempted liberalization of services in the European Union 
(EU). The EU is a unique example of 'globalization', in the sense that Member States 
have formally and voluntarily given considerable economic power to supranational 
institutions, processes and actors. Hence, if anything 'constraints' if they do indeed exist, 
4 David Held et al., Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1999), 4. 
2 
5 See, Kenichi Ohmae, The Borderless World: Power and Strategy in The Interlinked Economy (New York: 
Harper Business, 1990). 
3 
should be ever more evident. This is also true because the EU has adopted a form of 
economic integration largely based on neoliberal economic thinking. 
The founding principle of the Single Market in the EU is the free movement of 
capital, labor, services, and goods. 6 From the very beginning the EU was based on the 
neoliberal economic model. The Rome Treaty of 1958 which gave birth to the European 
Economic Community (EEC) was based on neoliberal economic thinking. 7 Subsequent 
economic agreements including the Single European Act (SEA) and the Treaty of 
Maastricht, which included an agreement on a Monetary Union (EMU), have reinforced 
this fact and have ingrained the logic of neoliberal economics in the functioning of the 
EU. The logic of the Single Market is that producers need access to a large market not 
only to sell their products and services but also to take advantage of economies of scale. 
As a consequence consumers can buy cheap products and services. Likewise, the 
European Central Bank controls inflation through a centrally controlled interest rate, 
while strict inflationary rules prevent states from accumulating high deficits. 
Neoliberal economic theory is not only embedded in the EU Treaties, it is also the 
ideology of the major bureaucratic arm and policy formulation body in the EU, the 
Commission. Since the SEA was negotiated, the Commission has consistently argued that 
the liberalization and completion of the internal market in both services and goods is 
central for EU prosperity.8 Because of its power to initiate and shape policies, the 
Commission has considerable influence on the direction the EU takes on a particular 
issue. The Commission has been the leading actor in terms of pushing for the completion 
6 EU, "Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community," Official Journal of the 
European Communities, c 325/33, 24 December 2002. 
7 Bill Lucarelli, The Origins and Evolution of the Single Market in Europe (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999), 35-
39. 
8 This is discussed in detail in the Chapter 2. 
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of the internal market, and in this sense it has acted as an external force applying pressure 
on Member States to move in a neoliberal direction. 
Another reason why the EU, and in particular the issue of the liberalization of 
services in the EU, is an excellent case study to test the 'constrained-state thesis' is that, 
with respect to formal and informal trade barriers, the same situation exists at the global 
level as in the EU. In the global economy formal barriers (tariffs) to trade have declined 
as a result of international trade agreements. However, the significance and number of 
informal trade barriers (a.k.a. non-tariffbarriers) which usually take the form of health 
and safety regulations, have risen in recent years. 9 In the EU the same trend has occurred 
at least in the case of services. Although formal tariffs between Member States have long 
been removed, informal practices and regulations dramatically restrict the freedom of 
movement of service providers in the EU. 
Also, by looking at an area such as the EU in which states have formally given 
economic power to institutions and processes above them, we avoid the problem to which 
studies of the neoliberal policy convergence fall victim, namely that they assume that no 
hierarchy of types of economic relations exist between states. This confuses the issue 
because even if states around the world are adopting neoliberal polices, it may be due to 
the fact that neoliberalism is the model preferred by the most powerful economic states. 
If this is the case, it is not the global economic system that is producing convergence 
around the neoliberal economic model. It is the fact that the most powerful economic 
states in the global economy just happen, at this point in time, to prefer this type of policy 
9 United Nations, World Economic Situation and Prospects 2006, United Nations Publication, Sales 
No.E.06.II.c.2, 52-54. 
5 
program. By studying the EU we avoid this problem because all EU Member States are 
equally subject to pressure emanating from EU institutions. 
The predictions of the 'constrained-state thesis' are clear and relatively easy to 
test. For this reason and for the reasons discussed above the test conducted of the 
'constrained -state thesis' in this paper is a 'strong test'. 10 If the 'constrained state thesis' 
is correct, in the EU we would certainly expect to see the liberalization of services and, 
consequently, a shift in power in the regulation of services from the state to EU 
institutions and processes. Moreover, domestic political and economic realities in 
Member States should have little effect on the outcome of service liberalization 
considering that all the forces, externally and internally, are pushing the EU in this 
direction. If it can be demonstrated that in the EU economic policies are indeed 
conditioned by domestic political and economic realities, then the claims associated with 
the 'constrained-state thesis' would appear much less convincing. 
In his seminal work, entitled Governing the Economy, Peter Hall argued that 
economic policy is made by governments and "governments are political creatures." 11 
This is the fundamental premise of the argument made in this thesis. Domestic political 
and economic realities still play a major role in shaping economic strategies. Even if one 
accepts the argument that the nature of the global economy today created incentives to 
pursue particular policy options over others that does not mean that every state will adopt 
exactly the same policies. Different states often adopt different economic strategies and 
policies that reflect domestic economic and political realities. Moreover, the creation of 
10 Gary King, Robert 0. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific inference in 
Qualitative Research (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994) 30. 
11 Peter Hall, Governing the Economy: The Politics of State Intervention in Britain and France (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1986), 4. 
6 
supranational economic institutions which acquire economic power from sovereign states 
does not necessarily lead to policy convergence. The creation of supranational economic 
institutions will not lead to policy convergence because politics is involved and therefore, 
domestic political and economic realities will influence the way states behave and the 
policies they pursue within supranational institutions and arguably even more within 
purely international economic institutions. 
Because the main argument of this thesis is that national economic policy is 
affected by domestic economic and political realities, the Advocacy Coalition Framework 
(ACF) is used to explain the outcome of the services policy debate in the EU. 12 The ACF 
approach breaks down complex policy processes into manageable frameworks that 
explain policy outcomes. This approach simplifies and hence highlights the essence of 
complex policy struggles. It regards policy change, or the lack of policy change as the 
result of the struggle between competing groups of 'likeminded' individuals and groups 
who share beliefs about a certain issue. The ACF is a useful theoretical framework for 
explaining policy change in the EU because it captures the complex policy process that 
exists in the EU; it accounts for the variety and number of actors involved, the interaction 
that occurs between societal and governmental actors and the fact the policy change in 
the EU is a slow process. 
This thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 1 reviews the literature on the state in 
an era of economic globalization. Chapter 2 examines the events and trends that led to the 
attempted liberalization of service in the EU. Chapter 3 discusses the Commission's 
initial proposal for a Services Directive, which is followed by a detailed investigation of 
the reactions from across the EU to the proposal. Chapter 4 recounts the legislative 
12 The ACF framework is outlined in Chapter 5. 
journey of the Services Directive. Chapter 5 explains the outcome of the debate and 
political process surrounding the Service Directive by means if the Advocacy Coalition 
Framework (ACF). 
The research that forms the basis of this case study is the product of an in-depth 
review of EU reports and documents related to the debate over the liberalization of 
services in the EU. It is also informed by a series of interviews conducted with relevant 
EU and Member State officials in Brussels on the 24, 26 and 28 July 2006. 
7 
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Chapter 1 The State in the Era of Economic Globalization 
The 'globalization-as-constraint school' has spun a broad multidisciplinary 
literature. Scholars who contribute to this literature are referred to in a number of ways, 
including globalists and hyperglobalists. 13 Despite diverse theoretical approaches and 
normative preoccupations their arguments converge on similar claims: "the loss of 
national autonomy, the powerlessness of governments in the face of transnational capital, 
the obsolescence of the nation-state as an organizing principle."14 Most importantly, 
those who adhere to this perspective privilege economic factors as the driving force 
behind declining state power. 15 This is the underlying assumption that connects a whole 
range of constrained-state arguments and which leads to a shared conclusion, namely that 
the power of the state as an "organizing principle" is diminishing because of the power of 
market forces and the free movement of capital, in particular. 
Kenichi Ohmae argues that because of the international political economy, which 
has eroded the significance of state borders, the state should accept the "unarguable truth' 
that "people have the right to live well and to choose the best and cheapest from 
anywhere in the world."16 Ohmae concludes that governments play no substantial role in 
determining the choices that people make in terms of what they buy. He is suggesting that 
if a state tries to adopt policies inconsistent with the promotion ofliberal capitalism, its 
population will suffer. In this sense, the state is constrained in the type of economic 
policies it can adopt. The problem with this type of argument is twofold. First, the 
argument is in part normative and operates outside the realm of social scientific inquiry. 
13 Held et al., 2-14. 
14 Linda Weiss, The Myth of The Powerless State (New York: Cornell University Press, 1998), 2. 
15 Held et al., 2-14. 
16 Kenichi Ohmae, The Borderless World: Power and Strategy in the Interlinked Economy (New York: 
Harper Business, 1990), 205. 
9 
Second, if we are truly to understand what impact global economic integration has had on 
the state, we need to conduct detailed empirical investigations of what is happening. 
Ohmae's structural economic reasoning is more informed by normative arguments than 
empirical investigation. Adopting a structural economic perspective on globalization 
presupposes that economic power rests in global market processes and leads to the 
conclusion that the state is losing economic power. 
Although they adopt a different normative position than neoliberal thinkers like 
Ohmae, Marxists also employ structural economic reasoning. They highlight the 
oppressive nature of the world capitalist system. For example, Gary Teeple defines 
globalization as "the unfolding resolution of the contradiction between ever expanding 
capital and its national political and spatial formations." 17 He further defines 
globalization as "the arrival of self-generating capital at the global level; that is, capital as 
capital, capital in the form of the TNC, free of national loyalties, controls and interests."18 
Teeple argues that globalization is the actual "triumph of capitalism," or, in other words, 
the emergence and dominance of global economic agencies whose interests are not 
national, whose role it is to facilitate "global conditions for capital accumulation."19 
Marxists like Teeple generally view globalization as a stage in the development of 
capitalism brought on by a technological revolution precipitated by a revolution in the 
means of production. Politically, this perspective is the most radical since it predicts the 
end ofliberal democracy and the dismantling of the state. Following the demise of the 
powers of the state, the erosion of national cultural identities will occur and a single 
17 Stephen McBride and John Wiseman, Eds., Globalization and Its Discontents (New York: Palgrave, 
2000), 10-11. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid., 7. 
10 
global culture will emerge. Both Teeple and Ohmae, notwithstanding their different 
normative positions, argue that states end up adopting policies consistent with capital 
accumulation. In short, the argument is that MNCs and other international economic 
institutions and processes have rendered the state totally subservient to their interests. 
One of the most lucid 'globalist' arguments is made by Susan Strange in The 
Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy. Although Strange 
moves away from a purely economic perspective, her work certainly fits into the 
'globalization-as-constraint school'. Strange argues that "structural change in world 
economy and society" has rendered the state "just one source of authority among several, 
with limited power and resources."20 To test her assertion, Strange reviews ten areas of 
jurisdiction that are generally considered the domain of the state.21 Through this analysis 
Strange reaches the conclusion that "state authority in society and economy is 
shrinking. "22 
Most importantly, for the purposes of this thesis, Strange challenges the view that 
different models of capitalism are capable of coexisting in a globalized world. As 
evidence, she cites the convergence of liberal economic policy in developing countries 
and the dominance of neoliberal economic thinking in the US and Japan. Moreover, she 
argues that the trend toward neoliberal policy is being reinforced by alliances between 
multinational corporations, which have everything to gain from new technology and 
20 Susan Strange, The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996), 72. 
21 Ibid., 73-82. The ten jurisdictions are: The responsibility of defending national territory, maintaining the 
value of the currency, choosing the appropriate form of capitalist development, correcting the tendency of 
market economies to cyclical booms and slumps, providing a safety-net, the responsibility of taxation, 
overall development strategy, responsibility for building infrastructure, competitive market in the national 
economy, and the legitimate use of violence. 
22 Ibid., 82-87. 
11 
market exploitation.23 Strange suggests that state spending on social security has reached 
a peak and a decline in spending is inevitable.Z4 In terms of taxation, Strange argues that 
states are no longer capable of increasing spending by taxing businesses and private 
individuals. International business transactions are no longer directly the jurisdiction of 
one state and tax havens allow for businesses to escape heavy taxation. 
Strange uses this evidence to argue that states have limited capacity to initiate 
economic developmental strategies. In other words, states suffer from a diminishing 
capacity to influence the "direction, volume and content of trade flows."25 Strange cites 
the inability of the US and EU, despite protectionist intervention, to limit the flow of 
Asian imports into both markets. In other words, trade is determined by the market place 
and the principles of supply and demand. Strange takes this argument even further and 
suggests that because competitiveness in the market place is buttressed by a competitive 
environment in the national environment, "the protection of national champions and the 
award of monopoly privileges" is no longer a viable option.Z6 The logic is that national 
monopolies will not be able to sustain economic growth in a localized market with 
limited profits. 
Strange's assessment of the functional capacity of the state certainly reveals her 
pessimistic view of the future of the state. It is an argument based on the idea that the 
nature of economic competition between states in the global economy is qualitatively 
different from that existing in previous historical periods. States no longer enjoy 
complete economic authority because the costs of interfering in the economy are simply 
23 Ibid., 75. 
24 Ibid., 77. 
25 Ibid., 78. 
26 Ibid. 
12 
too high. Strange argues that this phenomenon, which she suggests has occurred in the 
last "twenty or thirty-years," is driven by "private enterprise in finance, industry and 
trade.'m Interestingly, Strange asserts that the current transformation of the state is so 
extensive and important that she compares it to the transition from feudalism to 
. 1' 28 capita Ism. 
The claim that economic integration, or globalization, has been driven by private 
actors is important because those who argue that globalization is a myth, or in any case a 
mischaracterization of the nature of economic integration today, generally argue that the 
proliferation of neoliberal policies is a consequence of that fact that globalization is 
driven by powerful economic states who benefit the most from their adoption and 
proliferation.29 This is why skeptics of globalization like Weiss, and Hirst and Thompson 
prefer to use the term internationalization as opposed to globalization to capture the 
current level of international economic integration. 30 The former implies that economic 
integration has occurred, but it is best understood as the integration of national economies 
that still retain their national character. Powerful states drive integration, not exogenous 
market forces. As Held et al. point out, the term globalization leaves the impression that 
the world market is totally integrated.31 
The 'constrained-state thesis' is to a large extent an attempt to explain the 
significance and existence of global phenomena. For example, Scholte cites the existence 
of 44,500 transborder companies, 250 multilateral regulatory institutions, $60 trillion in 
annual transborder movements of scrutinized funds, global environmental problems, 
27 Ibid., 4. 
28 Ibid., 87. 
29 Held et al., 5. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid. 
13 
global communications, and 16,500 civil society organizations to support the claim that 
"such a large accumulation of data surely suggests a significant trend away from 
territorialist social organization."32 The 'constrained-state thesis' is an attempt to explain 
the consequence of these global phenomena, especially the significance of global capital. 
The problem is that these data are only suggestive evidence in terms of supporting the 
claim that the state is no longer an important locus of power. One of the problems of the 
'constrained-state thesis', and globalization theory in general is that it largely relies on 
evidence that is anecdotal at best. Arguments like the 'constrained-state thesis' have 
increasingly penetrated the social sciences while thwarting the epistemological and 
methodological traditions of the social sciences, mainly, the positivist reliance on 
empirical investigation to inform and test theories. This is not to say that only positivist 
approaches are acceptable. However, all social scientific theory must have some 
empirical justification. The empirical support for the 'constrained-state thesis' is weak at 
best. 
Indeed, a large body of empirically supported research that challenges the main 
prediction of the constrained-state theory has appeared in recent years. In, Continuity and 
Change in Contemporary Capitalism, Kitschelt et al. find that there is very little 
empirical evidence to support the claim that globalization leads to a convergence around 
a single political economic model: 
First, convergence on any unique democratic capitalist political economic 
model is unlikely, both because there are strong theoretical reason to doubt 
such convergence is even functionally dictated and because path-dependent 
cognitive, institutional practices and political factors militate against it. 
Second, there are no strong empirical indicators that convergence is 
occurring. While national sectoral coordinated market economies are 
becoming more alike, and more like the latter, they are not becoming more 
32 Jan Art Scholte, Globalization: A Critical Introduction (New York: StMartin's Press, 2000), 58. 
like the liberal market economies. In fact, it might be argued that the 
differences between these two types have in several respects grown since the 
golden age and over the past fifteen years. 33 
There is also considerable empirical evidence to support the claim that welfare systems 
have been resilient in the face of globalization.34 Likewise, there is also evidence to 
suggest that tax burdens in welfare states have not decreased. 35 In an interesting 
14 
comparative study of corporatist versus weak labor systems Garrett and Lange found that: 
The concentration of heightened economic interdependence, increased 
competition in world markets, and economic decline since the early 1970s 
has had a marked impact on economic strategies pursued by governments in 
the advanced industrial democracies. But contrary to common wisdom, this 
combination of factors has not resulted in a pervasive trend toward 
convergence around neoliberalism .... Governments in weak labor systems 
have sought to minimize interventions in all facets of the economy and to 
heighten the disciplinary effects of market forces, although it is clear that 
these attempts have fallen far short of the pure 'free market.' In market 
contrast, economic strategies in corporatist political economies have 
combined traditional welfarist concerns with interventionist government 
industrial, investment, and labor market policies designed to promote 
competitiveness and flexible adjustment.36 
Beyond the question of neoliberal policy convergence there are other reasons to 
question the 'constrained-state thesis' as well. In particular, the idea that formal 
reductions in trade barriers have reduced the significance of state borders is misleading to 
some degree. There is little doubt that global barriers to trade in goods and services have 
declined in a formal sense, however informally, barriers to trade have risen. 
Environmental and public health and safety regulatory practices in developed countries, 
33 Herbert Kitschelt, Peter Lang, Gary Marks and John D. Stephens, eds., Continuity and Change in 
Contemporary Capitalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 459-460. 
34 John Stephens, Evelyn Huber and Leonard Ray, "The Welfare State in Hard Times," In Continuity and 
Change in Contemporary Capitalism, Kitschelt et al., eds., (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1999), 164-193. 
35 Duane Swank, "Funding the Welfare State: Globalization and the Taxation of Business in Advanced 
Market Economies," Political Studies 46 (3), (1998): 671-92. 
36 Geoffrey Garnett and Peter Lange, "Political Responses to Interdependence: What's "Left for the Left?" 
International Organization 45 (4), (Autumn, 1991): 539-564, 563. 
15 
significantly hamper the ability ofless developed countries to gain access to large 
markets in developed states. For example, it has been estimated that "African banana 
exports could grow by $410 million a year if the EU used international standards for 
traceable requirements and regulations on pesticide residues for agricultural imports, 
instead of its own standards."37 This calls into question the vision of a fully integrated 
world economy in which goods and services are sold and bought at the lowest possible 
prices, further highlighting the importance of separating normative arguments from 
arguments built on sound empirical evidence. 
One of the leading critics of the 'constrained-state thesis' is Linda Weiss. She 
argues that states still have the capacity to form and implement domestic industrial 
economic strategies that contribute to national economic growth. She defines state 
capacity as the ability of "policy making authorities to pursue domestic adjustment 
strategies that, in cooperation with organized economic groups, upgrade or transform the 
industrial economy."38 Moreover, Weiss suggests that the state in many instances is best 
suited for coordinating change. One of the main themes in her argument is that states that 
have domestic transformative capacity (the ability to adjust domestic industrial policy) 
have a significant advantage in an internationalized economy. Consequently, increased 
internationalization will allow those states that have a strong domestic transformative 
capacity to influence the direction of international economic integration. 
To support her argument, Weiss cites evidence that economic integration in the 
EU is driven by Germany and reflects German corporatism. Weiss further argues that the 
same pattern is evident in Asia where economic integration reflects the economic 
37 United Nations, 55. 
38 Weiss, The Myth of the Powerless State, 22. 
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characteristics of Japan, Asia's main economic engine. Weiss argues that state policy 
capacities have not been diminished, instead state influence and power have a changing 
dynamic. This directly challenges the argument that states no longer have the capacity to 
formulate industrial strategies in light of a globalized economy.39 
Weiss rightly points out that the concept of globalization implies that states are no 
longer important economic actors. 40 To challenge this view, Weiss questions the 
foundations of the argument. She argues that the current level of capital flows is not 
unprecedented.41 Likewise, she suggests that if you look at trade and foreign direct 
investment (FDI) figures closely, it is evident that in both cases the trend is downward in 
the last decade or so, which suggests less economic integration.42 In terms of trade and 
capital flows (the only exception being international money markets), "the result is not so 
much a globalized world as a more internationalized one, where national and regional 
interaction networks remain vibrant and continue to highlight the importance of 
institutions and place."43 The implication of this argument is that differences in state 
capacities will increase. Differences in state capacity are highlighted by 
internationalization because states that have strong transformative capacity will be able to 
influence the nature of economic integration.44 
In a more recent collaborative effort, Weiss strengthens her challenge to the 
'constrained-state thesis' by empirically testing a number of hypotheses, namely that 
states suffer from "a diminishing capacity to extract revenue over time," show " a 
39 Ibid., 189. 
40 Ibid., 168-169. 
41 Ibid., 171. 
42 Ibid., 178. 
43 Ibid., 187. 
44 Ibid., 194. 
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declining propensity to engage in social spending," and have "a waning ability to 
promote industry and trade."45 Weiss et al. find increased direct tax yields, differentiated 
social spending and coordinated economic states maintaining and expanding social 
spending and increased efforts to coordinate industrial policy and industrial innovation. 
These findings directly challenge the view that states have been forced to step back from 
economic planning and simply adopt a neoliberal agenda: 
However much globalization throws real constraints in the ways of state 
activity, most notably in the macroeconomic arena, it also allows states 
sufficient room to move, and thus to act consistent with their social policy 
and economic upgrading objectives.46 
Others have challenged the 'constrained-state thesis' by reversing the argument 
that technology has enabled capital to move and operate outside the control of the state. 
This is one of the central propositions of the 'constrained-state thesis'. Without the free 
movement of capital it would be difficult to argue that market forces impose policy 
pressure on the state. If states control the movement of capital, their power is much 
stronger than suggested by the 'constrained-state thesis'. Eric Helleiner argues that the 
information technological revolution has increased state capacity to "regulate money 
movements."47 Helleiner questions the claim that technology innovation is taking power 
away from states. He argues that states are able to employ new innovations in technology 
for their own benefit; they can easily track the movement of capital and possibly regulate 
capital flows more aggressively should they so choose. Helleiner raises the issue of 
whether the liberalization of capital controls is the result of an inability to control capital 
45 Weiss, States in the Global Economy: Bringing Domestic Institutions Back In, 294-317. 
46 Ibid., 296. 
47 Eric Helleiner, "Electronic Money: A Challenge to the Sovereign State," Journal of International Affairs 
51 (2), (Spring, 1998): 387-409. 
18 
or simply the consequence of "British and American interests in financial 
globalization."48 Helleiner asserts that one could argue that the liberalization of capital 
controls was a consequence of strategic choice, not a forced consequence of market 
forces as suggested by the 'constrained-state thesis'. To make the case that "competitive 
deregulation pressures are not overwhelming," Helleiner cites the 1988 Basle Accord on 
Bank for International Settlements and the cooperative effort of the Financial Action 
Task Force under the auspices of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) to regulate money laundering, as examples of how states can and 
do, when they so choose, regulate international financial transactions.49 
What is particularly striking about the 'constrained-state thesis' literature is it that 
it contradicts a large comparative political economy literature that focuses on national 
economic policy strategies in an era of increasing international economic integration. 50 
Within this literature, scholars differ with respect to what factors should be privileged in 
explaining national economic strategies in the face of a changing international economic 
environment. Peter Hall argues that the most important variable in explaining economic 
48 Ibid., 392. 
49 Ibid. 
50 This literature developed in the 1970s in response to two interrelated developments. First, in the 1970s a 
number of economic circumstances encouraged scholars to re-examine the relationship between the 
international economy and domestic economic policy. In the 1970s, two major oil crises shook the world 
economy. No state was left unscathed by the forming of Organization for Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC) and the subsequent increase in the cost of oil. Also, economic development in third world 
countries was not occurring despite the promise of modernization theory. Increased global economic 
integration and modernization efforts were not leading to economic prosperity for many countries. In light 
of these developments, scholars of political economy began to reexamine the two dominant approaches in 
the field: political culture and dependency. The result was that scholars began to challenge the view that 
politics and economics were separate phenomenon. Scholars like Peter Gourevitch began formulating 
theoretical frameworks to account for both domestic and international factors in explaining economic 
policy strategies. In effect, the goal was to balance the claims of dependency and political culture theory. 
See W. Rand Smith, "International Economy and State Strategies: Recent Work in Comparative Political 
Economy," Comparative Politics 25 (3), (April, 1993): 351-372. 
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policy is the organization of social and political forces. 51 Gosta Esping-Anderson 
emphasizes the role of ruling coalitions like Peter Gourevitch, but goes further and 
examines how economic policy after implementation affects the ruling coalition and 
social structure within a state. 52 This entire literature supports the idea that politics 
matters and that economic policies have to be politically viable as well as economically 
viable. 
The debate between advocates of the 'constrained-state thesis' and its opponents 
discussed in the preceding pages is unlikely to end anytime soon. If anything, both camps 
are likely to dig in deeper as the debate surrounding globalization increases in importance 
and intensity. The empirical investigation of the Services Directive in the EU contained 
in this thesis is a contribution to the increasing empirical evidence that challenges the 
'constrained-state thesis'. 
51 Hall. 
52 Gosta Esping-Anderson, Politics against Markets: The Social Democratic Road to Power (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1990). Peter Gourevitch, Politics in Hard Times: Comparative responses to 
International Crisis (London: Cornell University Press, 1986). 
Chapter 2 Background: External and Internal Pressures for 
Service Liberalization 
20 
Two trends led to the issuing of a Services Directive in the EU. 53 First, despite the 
fact that the Treaty Establishing the European Community (EC Treaty) clearly states that 
service providers have the right to operate freely throughout the EU, informal and formal 
practices have prevented service providers from operating efficiently outside their 
country of origin. Second, it became evident during the 1990s that the economy in the EU 
was losing ground to other developed countries in terms of the percentage of the gross 
domestic product (GDP) created by the service industry and in the development of 
competitive service providers. Even though services account for nearly 70% of the EU's 
GDP, "the size of ..... the services sector is still below the OECD average."54 In addition 
the Commission laid the foundation for the liberalization of services by connecting 
service liberalization with the construction of a European social model. 55 The 
Commission began arguing that social cohesion and social inclusion in the EU depended 
upon the liberalization of services, especially those of general economic interest 
(transport, telecommunications, etc). As a result, in the 1990s the Commission began 
attempting to liberalize services in the EU in order to develop efficient competitive 
service providers and promote social cohesion and social inclusion. The argument 
53 Directives are the most common form of legislation in the EU. If adopted a directive becomes law in the 
EU and is binding on all Member States, such that Member States must meet the objectives of a Directive. 
How this is accomplished is up to individual member States. The Commission is responsible for issuing 
proposals for directives, which depending on the issue go through one of four main decision making 
procedures: consultation, co-operation, co-decision and assent. 
54 Line Vogt, The EU's Single Market: At Your Service?, OECD, Economic Department Working Paper 
No. 449, ECO/WKP, 2005,4. And COM, "The State of the Internal Market for Services," 441 final, 3 July 
2002,7. 
55 In other words, market efficiency ultimately is best for the European Social Model because it allows 
workers from all over to gain employment through access to economic sectors, and prices should remain 
low in a competitive environment. 
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showed that the Commission espoused the neo-liberal view that the market allocates 
resources in the most efficient manner. 
Legally, the functioning of the service sector in the EU was governed originally 
by the Treaty of Rome. The Treaty of Rome is now incorporated into the Treaty 
Establishing the European Community. 56 The definition of services in the EC Treaty is 
clear: activities of an industrial and commercial character and the activities of craftsmen 
and professionals are covered. The EC Treaty gives service providers the right to operate 
in countries other than their country of origin. Article 49 states that "restrictions on 
freedom to provide services within the Community shall be prohibited in respect of 
nationals of Member States who are established in a State of the Community other than 
that of the person for whom the services are intended."57 Article 50 states that "the person 
providing a service may, in order to do so, temporarily pursue his activity in the State 
where the service is provided, under the same conditions as are imposed by that State on 
its own nationals."58 However, the phrase 'the same conditions" has been a source of 
conflict within the EU. Some have interpreted this phrase inclusively to mean that all 
service providers operating in a Member State are subject to the same authorization 
schemes, the same professional requirements, etc. Others have interpreted in a more 
restrictive manner to mean that service providers are only subject to the same safety 
codes, work safety rules, etc, in the Member State in which they are providing a service if 
it is not their country of primary establishment. At stake is the question of whether 
service providers must establish their credentials in another Member State, or simply 
56 For the sake of clarity, EC Treaty is referred to in the remainder of the thesis. 
57 EU, "Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community," Official Journal of the 
European Communities, c 325/33, 24 December 2002. Article 49. 
58 Ibid., Article 50. 
provide a service consistent with the laws of the country in which they are established. 
According to Onno Brouwer, former legal secretary to the ECJ, the Court has 
consistently expressed the opinion that: 
[ ... ] not [ ... ] all national legislation applicable to nationals of [ ... ] [a] state 
[ ... ] may be similarly applied in its entirety to the temporary services of 
undertakings which are established in other Member States. [ ... ] The 
freedom to provide services is one of the fundamental principles of the 
Treaty and may be restricted only by provisions which are justified by the 
general good [ ... ] in so far as that interest is not safeguarded by the 
provisions to which the provider of the service is subject in the Member State 
ofhis establishment.59 
Indeed, the court has made it clear that service providers not established in the 
Member State in which they are offering a service should not be subject to all the 
regulatory mechanisms in that country. 60 In other words, if the service is of a temporary 
nature the service provider should not be subject to burdensome authorization and 
regulatory procedures as long as the service provider is established in the EU. The ECJ 
has ruled that informal and formal practices that unfairly restrict the free movement and 
establishment of services between Member States are in violation of the EC Treaty. 
The Commission had adopted the same interpretation as the ECJ. The Commission had 
argued since the late 1980s that service providers should be free to operate temporarily 
and establish themselves outside their country of origin.61 However, despite the 
Commission's and ECJ's best efforts, the number of internal market-service related 
59 ECJ, "Opinion of AG Jacobs," Case C-76/90, Sager v. Dennemeyer, 21 February 1991, para 27. 
60 Ibid., point 13: "Member State may not make the provision of services in its territory subject to 
compliance with all the conditions required for establishment and thereby deprive of all practical 
effectiveness the provisions of the Treaty whose object is, precisely, to guarantee the freedom to provide 
services." 
61 Mauro Miranda, Interview by Author, Commission European Union: Internal Market and Services, 23 
June, 2006. 
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infringements cases has steadily risen since the SEA revitalized economic integration in 
the EU. 
The rise in service related infringement cases is a repercussion of alternative 
interpretations by the ECJ and Member States of Article 49 and 50 of the EC Treaty. The 
ECJ and the Commission have interpreted these articles in a liberal way, while Member 
States have interpreted the same articles in a restrictive fashion. In any case, these 
different interpretations of the Treaty are a consequence of the different objectives and 
pressures facing Member States in comparison to those faced by the Commission and 
ECJ. From an integration and legal standpoint, it made sense for the Commission and 
ECJ to interpret the articles in the EC Treaty pertaining to services in a liberal fashion. 
However, Member States have to address domestic political, social and economic 
realities. It is not hard to understand why Member States have interpreted the EC Treaty 
in a restrictive manner in this instance. Member State governments have to protect local 
industry, deal with labor and get re-elected. Interpreting the EC Treaty in a liberal manner 
would have been politically difficult and may not have been in their best interest 
economically. EU institutions have a tendency to adopt the view that what is best for the 
EU is best for Member States. Member States do not necessary believe what is best for 
the EU is best for them. In the case of services, contradictory viewpoints lead to 
alternative interpretations of the EC Treaty and consequently a less than liberalized 
. 1 k 62 mtema mar et. 
62 Evidence supporting this claim would latter become the cornerstone of the Draft Services Directive. The 
Commissions evidence would be supported by a number of independent studies. 
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The legal framework that governs the operation of services in the EU is further 
complicated by the issue of 'services of general interest'. 63 Although this concept is used 
in the EC Treaty, it is not defined. In practice the concept refers to services of an 
economic nature that are subject to public service obligations. The concept "covers in 
particular certain services provided by the big network industries such as transport, postal 
services, energy and communications."64 The broader concept of services of general 
interest refers to both services of general economic interest and non-economic services 
such as health care, social welfare, etc, that have been classified by public authorities as 
of general interest and hence subject to public service obligations. The importance of 
services of general interest was recognized by the Cannes European Council held in June 
1995. The Heads of State agreed that services of general interest are part of the set of 
values shared by all Europeans.65 This position was subsequently adopted by the 
Commission in a report to the 1996 intergovernmental conference: 
Europe is built on asset of values shared by all its societies and combines the 
characteristics of democracy-human rights and institutions based on the rule 
of law-with those of an open economy underpinned by market forces, 
internal solidarity and cohesion. These values include access for all members 
of society to universal services or to services of general benefit, thus 
contributing to solidarity and equal treatment.66 
63 The concept of 'services of general interest' is not defined or specifically addressed in the EC Treaty. 
However, the term 'services of general economic interest' is referred to in Article 16 and 86 (2) of the 
Treaty. The concept is not defined in either article. Instead, the Treaty states the following: "given the place 
occupied by services of general economic interest in the shared values of the Union .... Undertakings 
entrusted with the operation of services of general economic interest or having the character of a revenue-
producing monopoly shall be subject to the rules contained in this Treaty, in particular to the rules on 
competition, in so far as the application of such rules does not obstruct the performance, in law or in fact, of 
the particular tasks assigned to them. The development of trade must not be affected to such an extent as 
would be contrary to the interests of the Community." EC Treaty, Article 16 and 86 (2). 
64 Ibid. 
65 Council of the European Union, "Conclusions of the Presidency," Sn 211/95, 26-27 June 1995, Point 
A.I.1.7. 
66 COM, "Reinforcing Political Union and Preparing for Enlargement- Commission Opinion for the 
Intergovernmental Conference," 90 final, 28 February 1996. 
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Subsequently, the Commission issued a communication in 1996 in which it 
argued that the "context in which general interest services are provided" has changed 
dramatically in recent years, specifically that concerning services of general economic 
interest. 67 As evidence, the Commission cited the rise of consumer demand for cheap 
quality services, worldwide competition, the need for modernization and the fact that 
unlike the postwar era after WWII, it is no longer difficult to raise private funding for 
public infrastructure. The Commission argued that the liberalization of services of 
general economic interest would allow the market to allocate resources efficiently. 
However, the Commission recognized that the benefits ofliberalization do not always 
extend to all citizens. Hence, it argued that in some cases public authorities would have to 
step in to make sure that social cohesion and social inclusion is protected. The 
Commission proposed a gradual sector-specific approach that would allow each sector to 
adjust accordingly. 
In 2001, in a report to the Laeken European Council, the Commission reiterated 
this position. The Commission noted that access to services of general economic interest 
was now included in the fundamental rights ofthe EU, citing Article 36 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights and Freedoms.68 It became a right with the adoption of the Charter 
that all EU citizens have access to affordable services of general economic interest. 
Consequently, it became necessary to develop legal certainty in this area. This lead to 
both a Green and White Paper on services of general economic interest in 2003 and 2004. 
67 COM, "Communication Form the Commission: Services of General Interest in Europe," 443 Final, 11 
September, 1996. 
68 COM, "Report to the Laeken European Council: Services of General Interest," 598 final, 17 October 
2001, 2-3. 
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Because the debate over services of general economic interest deals specifically with the 
question of the state's role in the economy, it was clear to the Commission and Member 
States that the issue needed to be clarified in Community law. What is important for the 
purposes of this paper is that the liberalization of services of general economic interest 
had become much more than just a matter of completing the internal market. It had 
become a matter of protecting the fundamental rights of EU citizens. This is important 
because it would become the lens through which the Commission articulated its position 
on the liberalization of services. 
Against this backdrop, the Lisbon European Council of March 2000 formulated 
the Lisbon Strategy. It was designed to facilitate the transition to a knowledge based 
economy in the EU while furthering social cohesion and sustaining economic growth. 
The Council concluded that the EU needed to adopt a new economic strategy in the face 
of"globalization and the challenges of a new knowledge-driven economy."69 The 
Council argued that both economic prosperity and social cohesion in the EU depended 
upon economic reform in light of changing global economic realities. Moreover, it argued 
that achieving comprehensive social cohesion and social inclusion required the 
completion of the internal market. The Council was adamant that unless a level playing 
field was created through comprehensive structural improvements, the goals of the 
Lisbon Strategy would not be met. The Council stated that the liberalization of the 
internal market, especially in the area of services, is necessary if the "full benefits of 
market liberalization are to be reaped."70 The Lisbon Strategy was and is in every sense a 
69 Council of the European Union, "Lisbon European Council 23 and 24 March 2000: Presidency 
Conclusions," DOC/00/8, 24 March 2000. Available on the World Wide Web at: 
http://europa.eu.int/ISPO/docs/services/docs/2000/jan-march/doc 00 8 en.html 
70 Ibid., 5. 
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response to the pressures created by globalization. Completing the liberalization of 
services was from the very beginning connected to achieving the goals set out in the 
Lisbon Strategy. 
To speed up liberalization, the Council asked the Commission to develop a 
general strategy for the removal of barriers to services by the end of 2000. In particular, 
the Council called for the liberalization process in the areas of gas, electricity, postal 
services and transport to be accelerated. The liberalization of services was viewed as a 
necessary structural improvement to reduce "the general level of State aids, shifting the 
emphasis from supporting individual companies or sectors towards tackling horizontal 
objectives of Community interest, such as employment, regional development, 
environment and training or research.',n The Lisbon Council envisioned a Europe with a 
fully integrated economy based on common practices and rules buttressed by an active 
welfare state protecting the European social model. 
In response, the Commission produced a comprehensive plan titled "An Internal 
Strategy for Services," in December of 2000. The Commission echoed the concerns of 
the Lisbon Council arguing that the pressures resulting from the information technology 
revolution and global competitiveness dictated that the EU allow services to flow freely. 
Indeed, the Commission feared that if the EU did not facilitate the removal ofbarriers to 
services, increased competition from foreign firms would devastate the EU economy.72 
The Commission recognized that globalization had reduced international trade barriers 
and hence entry barriers for foreign companies entering the EU.73 Therefore, it adopted 
71 Ibid., 6. 
72 COM, "An Internal Market for Services: Communication form the Commission to the Council and the 
EU Parliament," 888 final, 29 December 2000, 4-5, 6. 
73 Ibid. 
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the position that the ability of EU companies to compete domestically and internationally 
hinged on their ability to operate efficiently within the EU. As an example, the 
Commission explained how service providers had been unable to export business models 
outside their country of origin. In other words, different rules and practices across the EU 
made it difficult, if not impossible, for companies to employ a single business model 
across the EU. They demonstrated this by highlighting the obstacles that existed to the 
movement of services at each stage of the business process. 74 According to the 
Commission's report, the impact of these obstacles fall directly on the consumer. This 
reinforced the position adopted by the Commission that the liberalization of services 
between Member States was essential for consumers to be able to buy cheap and quality 
services. 
The Strategy outlined a two year plan to identify and address the problem of 
barriers to services in the EU. In the first stage the Commission would complete a 
detailed analysis of existing barriers. The Commission would also pressure Council and 
Parliament to speed up the legislative and political process related to ongoing directives 
I 
that dealt with services such as telecommunications, while simultaneously introducing 
new initiatives in problem fields such as commercial communications and financial 
services. In the second stage, the Commission would introduce both legislative and non-
legislative horizontal community-wide harmonization measures to address existing 
barriers to services identified in its analysis. 
74Ibid., 3. The Commission divided the business process into the following six stages: 1. Setting up the 
business 2. Use of inputs 3. Promotional activities 4. Distribution activities 5. Sales activities 6. After sales 
support. 
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The two stage process was welcomed by all Member States, the EU Parliament, 
the Economic and Social Committee and Committee of the Regions.75 In July of2002, 
the end of the first stage of the process concluded with the Commission presenting a 
report on the "The State of The Internal Market For Services." The report highlighted the 
fact that Member States were treating service providers not established in their territory 
as if they were established in their territory. For example: 
A patent agent who occasionally provides a service in another Member State 
is subject to an obligation to obtain authorization from the latter, to meet the 
professional qualifications required there, and to enroll in a specific register; 
or a landscaping architect who is temporarily providing a service in another 
Member State is subject to the obligation to be a member of the national 
association and to comply with all the professional rules of that country.76 
As this example demonstrates, service providers not established in the Member State in 
which they are attempting to provide a service are facing barriers to which they should 
not be subject. The report showed that significant barriers exist because of authorization 
and registration practices that made it very difficult to get approval to provide services 
outside a provider's country of origin. The Commission cited the fact that in some cases, 
service providers are required to register with up to three authorities, each taking 
significant time to process applications. 77 Of course, the key question is whether these 
regulations should be applied to service providers established outside the Member State 
in question. The European Court of Justice has made it clear that service providers 
offering a temporary service are not to be subject to the same requirements as established 
service providers in Member States where they are trying to offer a service. The report 
75 COM, "Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Services in the 
Internal Market," 2 final/3, 5 March 2004, 6. 
76 COM, "The State of the Internal Market for Services," 52. 
77 Ibid., 18. 
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highlighted this fact and demonstrated that there exists considerable barriers to the 
freedom of establishment of services and the freedom of movement of services between 
Member States. Likewise, the report established the fact that barriers to services have 
common features. This was an important finding because it laid the foundations for the 
horizontal approach the Commission would later adopt. If there had not been significant 
similarities between the types ofbarriers that existed across different sectors the 
Commission would probably have chosen to design initiatives sector by sector. 
Traditionally, this was the approach the Commission had adopted. Specific initiatives 
were designed to address particular service sectors within the internal market. However, 
the report identified that both the legal and behavioral barriers that exist across different 
service activities "ha[d] a number of common traits in both their origins and effects."78 
The report was welcomed by the Council and Parliament, and in March 2003 the 
Spring European Council reiterated the need for a legal framework to remove the barriers 
to services in the EU. 79 The Council proclaimed that the report provided an excellent 
"basis for the second stage ofthe Strategy."80 The Council even encouraged the 
Commission to develop a single legislative instrument to remove barriers to services. 
Parliament also welcomed the report and reiterated its support for community-wide 
harmonization measures based on the principle of mutual recognition. Interestingly, 
Parliament stated that automatic recognition should "be encouraged as far as possible."81 
78 Ibid., 7. 
79 See, Council of the European Union, "2462nd Council Meeting on Competitiveness," 13839/02 (Press 
344), Brussels, 14 November 2002. And COM, "2002 Review of the Internal Market Strategy- Delivering 
the Promise," AS-0026/2003, 5 March 2004, point 35. 
8° Council of the European Union, "2462nd Council Meeting on Competitiveness," 5. 
81 COM, "2002 Review of the Internal Market Strategy- Delivering the promise," 11. 
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The Commission, in the period leading up to the actual formulation of a draft 
Services Directive, began arguing persuasively that the liberalization of services in the 
EU was essential to complete the internal market and to promote the European social 
model. The Commission's position transcended the question of simply completing the 
internal market. It became about responding to globalization, promoting social inclusion 
and cohesion and providing citizens with the enjoyment of their fundamental rights. This 
position was welcomed by all EU institutions and received support from a number of 
European Councils. Most importantly, support was building for a comprehensive 
community-wide harmonization initiative. This was an integral component of the second 
stage of the Commission's Strategy. In short, the foundations had been laid for the 
liberalization of the services sector. 
32 
Chapter 3 The Commission's Proposal for a Services Directive 
3.1 The Proposal for a Services Directive 
In May of 2003, the Commission presented a "Proposal for a Directive of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on Services in the Internal Market," completing 
the second stage of the Internal Strategy for Services. The Commission's initial proposal 
for a Services Directive had two main objectives. First, to lay the foundations for a legal 
framework and to develop a convergence program with respect to codes of conduct at the 
community level, without which the legal framework outlined in the previous chapters 
would certainly be ineffective. 
Chapter I of the Directive outlines its scope in terms of what services are covered. 
All "services supplied by providers established in a Member State" are included except 
for aspects of the financial, electronic and transport industries, which are covered by 
other community instruments: 
The proposed Directive covers a wide range of different services provided to 
consumers and to businesses. Examples of the services covered are: business 
services such as management consultancy, certification and testing, facilities 
management (including office maintenance and security), advertising, recruitment 
services, and the services of commercial agents; services provided both to businesses 
and to consumers including legal or fiscal advice, real estate services such as estate 
agencies, construction (including the services of architects), distributive trades, the 
organization of trade fairs, car rental, travel agencies, and security services; and 
finally consumer services including health care services, household support services, 
such as help for the elderly, tourism, audio-visual services, leisure services, sports 
centers and amusement parks. 82 
Chapter II deals with the freedom of establishment for service providers. Articles 
(6) and (7) clearly state that Member States must establish 'single points of contact' 
through which service providers can obtain all the necessary information and 
82 COM, "Frequently Asked Questions on the Proposed Directive on Services in the Internal Market," 
Available on the World Wide Web at: http://europa.eu.int/comm/intemal market/services/services-
dir/faq/20041 0-fag-pointO 1 en.htm# 12 
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documentation related to the procedures and formalities that are required to establish a 
service company in a Member State. Information must be made available electronically 
to assure that it is accessible from anywhere within the EU. Assistance must also be 
provided in a timely manner and applications must be assessed without delay, in order to 
assure that problems associated with applications are dealt with efficiently. Section 2 lists 
the rules that govern the introduction of authorization schemes and how they are to apply 
to service providers. Articles (9), (10), (11), (12), and (13) restrict the ability ofMember 
States to require special requirements from service providers not established in their 
territory. 
Chapter III deals with the free movement of Services. Section 1 of Chapter III 
covers the 'country of origin principle'. The premise of the 'country of origin principle' 
is that service providers are only subject to the rules and regulations of their Member 
State of origin.83 In other words, service providers offering a temporary service outside 
their country of origin are subject to the national provisions of the Member State in which 
they are established, regardless of where they provide a service. Moreover, the Member 
State of origin is required to monitor the services offered by service providers originating 
from its territory. Also, Member States can not require service providers from other 
Member States to establish themselves in the country in which they wish to provide a 
service, or ban the setting up of infrastructure required to provide a service. 
Chapter IV deals with the issue of quality of services. Article (26) outlines the 
information that Member States must ensure is made available by providers to the 
recipients of services. The onus is placed on the country of origin to ensure that service 
83 In essence, the 'country of origin principle' is the principle applied to the movement of goods in the EU. 
Cassis de Dijon Judgment of the ECJ, Case 120/78, 20 February 1979, 979. 
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providers are able to produce any information requested related to the qualifications, 
history and professional rules in the case of professional occupations. Chapter V covers 
the rules with respect to the supervision of service providers operating outside their 
country of origin. Member states have to ensure that they have the necessary capacity to 
monitor and supervise the activities of service providers established in their territory. 
The final Chapter outlines the second major objective of the Services Directive. 
Member States and the Commission are required to formulate community wide codes of 
conduct "in conformity with community law." Member states will in turn be responsible 
for encouraging "professional bodies, organizations and associations" at the national 
level to implement Community wide codes of conduct. The idea is that by the time of 
entry into force of the Services Directive, community wide harmonization instruments 
would exist in all service sectors of the economy. 
In summary, the proposal for a Services Directive put forth by the Commission in 
2003 was based on a horizontal approach to the removal of barriers to services. Member 
States would be required to consult and work with other Member States and review their 
existing legal regulations to make sure that the provision of services was not being 
restricted. The proposed Directive was comprehensive and inclusive. This is not really 
surprising for a number of reasons. First, up until this point all the actors and institutions 
involved agreed that it was imperative that barriers to services be removed. Second, the 
evidence suggested that a vertical approach based on a sector by sector analysis of the 
barriers to service would take too long and in all likelihood be ineffective. Moreover, the 
evidence suggested that the problems associated with services were common amongst 
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different economic sectors. Finally, the legal precedent to operate without burdensome 
mechanisms restricting the freedom of services had been established by the ECJ.84 
3.2 The Reaction 
The response to the Commission's proposal for a Services Directive was 
immediate, unexpected, and mostly unfavorable. The most moderate response came from 
a number of influential Committees in the EU's vast Committee structure. The opinion of 
the Committee of Regions (COR) was published on 18 February 2005. Although the 
Committee welcomed the services Directive, its enthusiasm was mitigated by what it 
viewed as a lack of clarity in the Directive, especially with respect to the 'country of 
origin' principle.85 The Committee raised the issue of whether it was practical for 
countries of origin to be responsible for the supervision of social and health care based 
services in other Member States. According to the Committee it was not clear what legal 
jurisdiction countries of origin would have in other Member States. The Committee also 
questioned how the Services Directive would work in light of the large body of existing 
Community legislation in the areas covered by the Directive. Moreover, it feared that the 
scope of the Directive would override all national authorization schemes. The Committee 
was unsure whether this type of interference in national procedural processes was 
necessary or desirable. It feared that the Directive might undermine existing legislation 
and the country of origin principle might allow service providers to circumvent domestic 
standards for such things as professional qualifications and quality of services. The 
84 ECJ, "Opinion of AG Jacobs," point 13. 
85 COM, "Opinion of the Committee of the Regions on the Proposal for a Directive of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on services in the Internal Market," Official Journal of the European 
Communities C 43, 18 February 2005. 
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Committee also called for services of general economic interest to be excluded entirely 
from the scope ofthe services Directive, not just excluded from the country of origin 
principle. 
·The European Economic and Social Committee (ESC) echoed the same concerns 
as that articulated by the Committee of Regions. It also expressed concern over the lack 
of clarity and scope of the Services Directive. 86 With respect to the country of origin 
principle the Committee argued that the blanket application of the principle needs to be 
revisited. In particular, the Committee argued that services of general economic interest 
should be excluded from the country of origin principle to ensure that the principle does 
not apply to sectors like health, thereby interfering with the ability of Member States to 
ensure that such services are properly provided for citizens of their country. 87 
Outside the EU, opposition to the Commission's proposal quickly mounted. 
Think tanks, trade unions, and public service unions responded critically to the proposal. 
The European Federation of Public Service Unions (EFPSU) issued a resolution opposing 
the Services Directive. The EFPSU argued that the Directive was unclear and might take 
priority over collective agreements. 88 The European Trade Union Federation (ETUC) 
issued a statement calling for drastic changes to the Services Directive. The ETUC 
argued that the Directive should not cover areas of general economic interest, nor should 
it be allowed to interfere with collective agreements, etc. The ETUC was worried that the 
86 EESC, "Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the Proposal for a Directive of the 
European Parliament and the Council on Services in the Internal Market," INT/228, 10 February 2005, 
section 3.3.4. 
87 Ibid., 3.3.6, 3.5.3. 
88 EPSU, "EPSU Congress Resolution on the Directive on Services in the Internal Market," Adopted by 
Congress on 15 June 2004. Available on the World Wide Web at: http://www.epsu.org/a/634. 
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Directive would strip away social protection. 89 Similarly, the European Mine, Chemical 
and Energy Workers' Federation (EMCEF) rejected the proposed Directive on the basis 
that the removal of national regulations with respect to the services sector would produce 
an unstable and unfair labor market.90 
Also, left leaning think tanks began producing reports that challenged the 
conclusions reached by proponents of the Directive. Professor Niklas Bruun, working on 
behalf of the National Institute of Working Life in Stockholm and the Hanken School of 
Economics in Helsinki wrote a detailed and damning report on the likely repercussions of 
the proposed Directive. Professor Bruun highlighted the fact that the 'country of origin 
principle' alters the objectives of the acquis communautaire in terms oflabor law. 
Specifically, he pointed out that the "Rome Convention on the law applicable to 
contractual obligations," states that the employment relationship is governed by the host 
Member State if a worker temporarily carries out work of a habitual nature.91 In other 
words, if a worker is working habitually for a temporary period the employment 
relationship must be governed by the law of the host Member State. The 'country of 
origin principle' states the opposite, stipulating that the employment rules ofthe 'country 
of origin' apply. Likewise, Professor Bruun argued that the 'country of origin principle' 
would likely come into conflict with EU insolvency law, health and safety regulations 
and "EU recognition of collective agreements."92 
89 ETUC, "ETUC calls for Further Crucial Changes to the Draft Services Directive to Protect Workers and 
Consumers in Both the Old and New Member States," 6 December, 2005. 
90 EMCEF, "Motion on the Rejection of the Bolkestein Directive at the EMCEF Congress", 8-10 June 
2004. Available on the World Wide Web at: http://www.emcef.org/news/bolestein-en.pdf. 
91 Niklas Bruun, "Employment Issues: Memorandum," Prepared for the European Parliament Public 
Hearing on the Proposal for a Directive on Services in the Internal Market, Brussels 11 November 2004, 5. 
92/bid. 
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However, the Directive did receive support from a few stakeholders, such as EU 
business associations. The Union of Industrial and Employers' Confederations of Europe 
(UNICE) issued a statement applauding the efforts of Commission. The UNICE position 
is clear; it welcomes any initiative designed to "allow rapid removal of obstacles to the 
exercise of fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty."93 The Directive also 
received approval from the economic consulting firm hired by the Commission to provide 
an objective view of the economic repercussions of reducing barriers to services in the 
EU. The report produced by Copenhagen Economics argued that the proposed Directive 
would substantially increase the number of jobs in the EU, intensify competition, and add 
€30 billion in value to the services sector.94 
The Directive was also given support by the OECD. In October of2005, the 
economics department of the OECD issued a report titled The EU's Single Market: At 
Your Service?, which echoed the findings of the Copenhagen study. The OECD argued 
that the services Directive would go a long way "towards establishing a single market for 
services if it is implemented as proposed.'.95 Also, it would allow EU citizens to gain 
from 'large welfare effects associated with the convergence of prices towards the best 
performers and faster trend towards economic growth."96 Interestingly, the paper 
included a warning against allowing the scope of the Services Directive to be watered 
down. The OECD argued that any attempt to water down the Services Directive through 
legislative amendments would only delay the achievement of a single market for 
93 UNICE, "UNICE Comments on the European Commission's Proposal for a Directive on Services in the 
Internal Market," BSB/Tdl, 9 August 2004. 
94 Copenhagen Economics, "Economic Assessment of the Barriers to the Internal Market for Services," 
Final Report, January 2005, 7-9. 
95 Vogt, 2. 
96 Ibid. 
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services. 97 Of course, it is not surprising that business groups and economic think tanks 
supported the Commission's proposal. The Commission's proposal is based on the logic 
of the 'invisible hand' and liberal economic theory, which is generally the view held by 
the business community, developmental organizations and liberal economic think tanks. 
Basically, the response by these actors was to reiterate what the Commission and Council 
had agreed was the appropriate course of action in the years leading up to the 
Commission's proposal. 
However, it should be made clear that the response was overwhelmingly negative 
and was, by every account, intense and unexpected. 98 It was at this point that a number 
of Member States, specifically politicians in Member States, realized that the 
consequence of moving forward in the direction put forth by the Commission was not a 
politically viable option domestically. 99 
As a response, EU Internal Market chief Charlie McGreevy had little choice but 
openly confirm that the Commission would revisit the controversial Directive. 
Specifically, McGreevy stated "it is crystal clear to me that there are real problems with 
the services Directive .... as drafted it is not going to fly." 100 He also stated that he 
"wanted to address the country of origin concerns in as balanced way as possible."101 
The initial proposal for a Services Directive by the Commission was not received 
warmly by many stakeholders. Those who opposed the Directive in its original form 
vocalized their opposition more effectively than those who where in favor of it. This 
97 Ibid., 25. 
98 EU Parliament, "Public Hearing on the Proposal for a Services Directive on Services n the Internal 
Market," Committee on the Internal market Consumer Protection, Brussels, 11 November 2004. This 
assertion was also made by the three EU officials interviewed for this thesis. 
99 This is discussed in detail in the final chapter of thesis. 
100 EU Parliament, "Public Hearing on the Proposal for a Services Directive on Services in the Internal 
Market". 
101 Ibid. 
reaction was unexpected and Member States, in which opposition was most acute 
including France and Germany, used their influence at Council meetings to make it 
known that the Directive was unacceptable in the form put forth by the Commission. 
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Chapter 4 The Legislative Process 
4.1 The Debate at Parliament and Amended Proposal 
The Co-decision procedure is a complex procedure that requires agreement 
between the EP and Council. After the Commission issues a proposal, the proposal is 
debated in Parliament and Council. Ultimately, Council and Parliament must both agree 
on a proposal, if not the proposal will be considered not adopted (see appendix 1.). Under 
the Co-decision procedure, the Commission's initial proposal for a Services Directive 
was sent to Parliament where the Internal Market and Consumer Protection Committee 
(IMCPC) was designated as the lead committee in charge of reviewing the Directive. 102 
Meanwhile, nine other Committees were asked to review the Directive. All ten 
committees called for substantial changes to the Services Directive. 103 
Because the European Parliament is arguably the EU institution most responsive 
to public pressure since Maastricht, it was in Parliament that opponents of the Directive 
primarily focused their efforts. Protests were organized by groups opposing the Directive 
and experts representing their position began lobbying Parliament. 104 By the time 
Parliament held a public hearing on the matter in November of2004, opponents ofthe 
Services Directive were lined up at the door. Although the public hearings involved 
stakeholders and experts from both sides, it was becoming clear that the Commission's 
proposal needed clarification, which was of great concern for those worried about issues 
such as social dumping and work exploitation. The public hearings held by Parliament 
102 Parliament was given co-decision powers over the internal market by the Treaty of Maastricht. See 
Appendix 1. Co-Decision Procedure Flow Chart. 
103 European Parliament, "Report on the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and the 
Council on Services in the Internal Market," Committee on the Internal market and Consumer Protection, 
A6-04092005 final, 15 December 2005. 
104 Some of the protests involved 20,000 people. These rallies were primarily organized by social groups 
and unions from across the EU. 
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provided a platform for those opposed to the Directive to appeal to citizens across 
Europe. 
The debate over the Services Directive lasted almost three years in Parliament. 
The process finally reached a conclusion on 16 February 2006. However, in the week 
prior to the plenary vote scheduled for 16 February each of the four major political 
groups in Parliament maneuvered to get the amendments they wanted, despite agreements 
reached during the Committee stage. A workable compromise was not reached until 8 
February 2006, between the two largest political groups in Parliament, the group of the 
European People's Party (Christian Democrats) and European Democrats (EPP-ED-
conservative), and the socialist group in the European Parliament (PSE-socialist). Despite 
threats from backbenchers to vote the Services Directive down, they managed to muster 
enough votes to pass the legislation. 105 A dramatically modified Services Directive 
received 394 votes, out of a possible 732 on 16 February 2006. 
In total, Parliament made 33 amendments to the Services Directive. Most 
importantly, the scope of the Directive was drastically diminished. Services of general 
economic interest "reserved to public or private entities," were removed from the scope 
of the Directive, nor would the Directive "affect the freedom of Member States to define, 
in conformity with Community law, what they consider to be services of general 
economic interest, how these services should be organized and financed and what 
specific obligations they should be subject to."106 Healthcare services and "services 
105 EurActiv, "Conservative and Socialists Vote the Services Directive Through," Published 24 February, 
2006. Available on the World Wide Web at: http://euroactiv.com/Artciel?tcmuri=tcm:29-152679-
16&type=News 
106 European Parliament, "Position of the European Parliament: Adopted at first reading on 161h February 
2006 with a View to the Adoption of Directive 2006/ . ./EC of the European Palriament and Council on 
Services in the Internal Market," EP-PE_TC1-COD(2004)0001, 16 February 2006, Article (1). 
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pursuing social welfare objectives" were totally removed from the scope of the Directive 
as were postal services, broadcasting, audiovisual services, temporary employment 
agencies and public transport. 107 
Not surprisingly, the main source of controversy contained in the first 
Commission's Services Directive, the 'country of origin principle', was removed by 
Parliament and replaced with the 'freedom to provide services' principle. The former 
states that countries of origin are responsible for monitoring the activities of service 
providers established in their territory, regardless if they are operating outside their 
territory. The new principle requires Member States to expand the scope of national law 
to include the operation of service providers outside their territory but does not require 
them to carry out "factual checks or monitoring in the Member state where the service is 
provided."108 Parliament's version ofthe Services Directive did not change whose rules 
would apply in the case of temporary service activities. Parliament did not remove the 
principle that service providers offering a service outside their state of primary 
establishment would be governed by their country of origin. The difference between the 
two principles lies in the fact that countries of origin are not required to monitor and 
enforce compliance, unless the Member State in which a service is being provided 
requests that action be taken the Member State of primary establishment. Member States 
in which services are being provided are responsible for "the checks, inspections and 
investigations requested by another Member State and shall inform the latter of the 
results and, as the case may be, of the measures taken."109 Of course, this requires 
excellent coordination between Member States and the Commission to make sure each 
107 Ibid., Article I, 2. 
108 Ibid., Article 16. 
109 Ibid., Article 18. 
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Member State understands and has easy and timely access to different Member State 
rules and regulations. In effect, it creates the need for a whole new level of bureaucratic 
coordination between Member States and the Commission, which are required by the 
Directive to play a substantial role in coordinating the processes of enforcement, making 
sure information is easily accessible through single points of contact and in alerting 
Member States if a service provider established in their country has violated their rules in 
another Member State. 
In short, the scope of the Directive was dramatically reduced and the country of 
origin principle was replaced with a new principle that arguably creates a more complex 
regulatory system that requires enhanced coordination. More importantly, under 
Parliament's proposal, Member States would retain significant power and capacity to 
influence the nature and direction of national economies. The Directive does not require 
States to liberalize sectors they designate as 'services of general interest' or as 'services 
of general economic interest', nor does it require states to dismantle monopolies that 
operate in sectors designated as either of general interest or general economic interest; 
meaning that the Directive does not challenge the operation of welfare systems, work 
conditions agreed upon through collective agreements, or challenge the operation of some 
of the most important economic sectors, including transport, banking and credit. 110 
In contrast to the Commissions proposal, Parliament's amended Services 
Directive received a warm response. Internal Market Chief Charles McGreevy greeted 
the vote with the following statement: 
I am convinced that we can have a workable Services Directive which will 
provide real value added. In all of this, the challenge is to get the balance 
right. We need a directive that will facilitate the cross-border provision of 
110 Ibid., Article 2 (b). 
services and at the same time, we need to ensure that public policy 
considerations can be safeguarded ..... On the Commission side we will begin 
work on preparing a modified proposal based on the vote in the European 
Parliament. I look now to the council of Ministers to complete the work 
which has been done by Parliament. 111 
On behalf of the Council Presidency, the Austrian Federal Minister for Economics and 
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Labor welcomed the vote citing the need for reduced barriers to services while protecting 
the European Social Model: "We can support the basic principles of removing unfair 
barriers. Parliament's vote will be the major basis for review ofthe proposal which the 
Commission needs to carry out."112 European Commission president Jose Manuel 
Barroso also welcomed the vote. He emphasized the importance of finally realizing one 
of the fundamental freedoms enshrined in the EC Treaty and stated that Parliament's 
revised proposal would be respected by the Commission. 113 
After years of heated debate, the compromise reached by Parliament was accepted 
as the best possible solution given the political sensitivity surrounding service 
liberalization. 114 Even those in favor of a more aggressive approach, including the 
British, accepted the fact that in order for a directive to be agreed upon, it would have to 
be relatively consistent with the compromise reached in parliament. The alternative 
would be no service Directive at all, and for Member States like the United Kingdom 
111 Charlie McCreevy, "Commissioner Charlie McCreevy's Statement on the Vote in the European 
Palriament in the Services Directive," European Parliament Plenary Session, SPEECH/06/95, Strasbourg, 
16 February 2006. 
112 European Parliament, "Strasbourg Plenary 13-16 February 2006- Debates and Votes," Available on the 
World Wide Web at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/expertlbackground_page/008-5223-47-2-7-901-
20060209BKG05095-16-02-2006-2006--false/default_p00 1c00 1_ en.htm. 
113 Ibid. 
114 See Charlie McCreevy, "Commissioner Charlie McGreevy's Statement on the Revised Proposal for the 
Services Directive." 
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with a service based economy, this would be the worst possible scenario. 115 The 
Commission wanted a Directive that at least could become the foundation of a system of 
governance for services, without which there would no legislation guiding the operation 
of services in the EU. 116 There would only be the Treaty articles that have been 
interpreted differently by different actors. 117 No agreement would have meant that no 
foundation was laid for the future operation of the service economy. 118 
4.2 Commission's Modified Proposal 
The compromise reached in Parliament set the parameters that structured future 
discussion on the Services Directive within the Commission and Council. With 
Parliament's revisions in hand, the Commission quickly set out to revise its original 
proposal. It took the Commission less than two months to issue an amended proposal for 
the Services Directive. The amended proposal basically followed the approach set out by 
Parliament. There were some minor differences but all the major and controversial 
Articles included in the Commissions first proposal were dropped in favor of the changes 
made by Parliament. Specifically, the country of origin principle was replaced by the 
freedom to provide services principle and a majority of the derogations introduced by 
Parliament were incorporated into the Commission's new proposa1. 119 
115 Interviews with Mauro Miranda, Interview by Author, Commission European Union: Internal market 
and Services, 23 June, 2006. Charis Xirouchakis, Interview by Author, Council of the European Union: 
General Secretariat, June 28, 2006. Confidential Source, Interview by Author, Brussels, June 26, 2006. 
116 Confidential Source, Interview by Author, Brussels, June 26, 2006. 
117 This is discussed in Chapter 1. 
118 Interviews with Mauro Miranda, Interview by Author, Commission European Union: Internal market 
and Services, 23 June, 2006. Charis Xirouchakis, Interview by Author, Council of the European Union: 
General Secretariat, June 28, 2006. Confidential Source, Interview by Author, Brussels, June 26, 2006 
119 See Charlie McCreevy, "Statement on the Revised Proposal for the Services Directive. And COM, 
"Amended Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Services in the 
Internal Market," 160 final, Brussels, 4 April2006. 
When the Commission's amended proposal was presented to Parliament for 
Debate, Evelyn Gedhardt, Parliament's rapporteur on the Services Directive stated the 
following: 
The Commission has bit the bullet on the Services Directive ... .I am delighted 
that the Commission has kept its word and has followed the vast majority in the 
Plenary. I know that it took hours of work by the heads of Cabinet even 
yesterday, but now the most important law besides the European Constitution is 
well on its way. We can go along on this way- or should one rather say the 
Commission goes along with Parliament.120 
The president of the Social Platform (ESP), Anne-Sophie Parent, stated that "the 
Commission has been wise to follow the European Parliament's line, cutting social 
services out of the services directive. The Social Platform welcomes the new proposal, 
which provides for a broad exclusion of social services. This is crucial to ensure that 
social services and society at large do not lose out from a directive not suited to the 
nature of the sector."121 The EPP-ED Group in the European Parliament also welcomed 
the Commission's proposal, specifically welcoming the freedom to 'provide services 
principle' .122 
4.3 Political Agreement: Council's Common Position 
I 
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The next step in the co-decision process was to achieve a common position in the 
Council. The issue was first addressed by the Brussels European Council in March of 
120 European Parliament, "Debate on the Commission's Second Proposal on the Services Directive,", 4 
April2006. Available on the World Wide Web at: 
www.euractiv.com/29/images/Services Debate 060404 tcm29-153990.pdf 
121 Ibid. "The Platform of European Social NGOs is the alliance of representative European federations and 
networks of non-governmental organizations active in the social sector. The Social Platform promotes 
social justice and participatory democracy by voicing the concerns of its member organizations." Available 
on the World Wide Web at: http://www.socialplatform.org/code/en/hp.asp 
122 Malcolm Harbour, "Services Directive- Commission Must Now Promote Service Market Plans," EPP-
ED Group in the European Parliament, 4 April2006. Available on the World Wide web at: http://epp-
ed.eu. 
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2006 at which time the heads of state from the 25 EU Members expressed their support 
for the vote of Parliament and the Commission's decision to follow the changes made by 
Parliament. 123 The first steps were made towards a common position at an informal 
meeting of EU Competition Ministers held in April, 2006 shortly after the Commission 
issued its modified proposal. The Commission's proposal, based on the compromises 
reached in Parliament received broad support from Member States. 124 Interestingly, for 
the first time, MEP participated in the Council discussions to make sure that Council 
understood the fragile nature of the compromise reached in Parliament. 125 
In May at the Competitiveness Council Meetings, a political agreement was 
reached: "The Council's agreement [was] based on a compromise text, put forward by the 
Austrian presidency which in substance [was] closely in line with the first reading of the 
European Parliament and the Commission's amended proposal based on that opinion."126 
It was agreed that Articles (16) and (17) would not be altered because these articles were 
the result of intense political debate and represent a delicate political compromise. 
Articles (16) and (17) cover the freedom to provide services and the derogations from this 
principle 
Two major additions were added by Council to the Commission's proposal. First, 
a review clause was added that requires the Commission to review the "application of the 
Directive," five years after the adoption of the Directive and subsequently every three 
years. Furthermore, the Commission has the responsibility of bringing forth any measures 
123 Council of The European Union, "Presidency Conclusions," 7775/1/06 REV 1, Brussels, 18 May 2006. 
124 Austrian Presidency EU, "Hartenstein: The Package For The Services Directive Will Not Be Unwrapped 
Again Now," 22 April2006. Available on the World Wide Web at: 
Http://www .eu2006. at/en/News/Press_ Releases/ April/2204bartenstein.html. 
125 Ibid. 
126 Council of The European Union, "Press Release 2731, Council Meeting: Competitiveness," Internal 
Market, Industry and Research, 9334/06, Brussels, 29-30 May 2006, 10. 
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"for matters excluded from the scope of application."127 In other words, the Commission 
can introduce legislation that it feels is required in area outside the scope of the Directive. 
However, any new directive related to services issued by the Commission would have to 
go through the co-decision procedure. Therefore, this legal phrase serves only to solidify 
the Commission's role in shaping the future of services policy in the EU, a role that is 
guaranteed by the Treaty. Second, a screening process was added which requires 
Member States to examine the compatibility of national legislation with respect to laws 
which may restrict the flow of services across borders. 128 The reason these amendments 
were added is because unlike Parliament, the Council and the Commission have to worry 
about implementation. There was a lot of discussion and concern about implementation 
in Council and these articles were added to meet these concerns. 129 The Council also 
decided to clarify the point that the Directive does not cover "labor law or social security 
legislation." 130 
The discussions in Council over the Commission's modified proposal were 
shaped by the compromise reached by Parliament, as were those in the Commission. The 
Common Position which will be debated again in Parliament ahead of a 2nd reading is 
very similar to the proposal that left Parliament in February. In all likelihood the 
Common Position will get enough votes in Parliament because the compromise reached 
at Parliament in February was not changed by the Commission or Council. In fact, the 
Council brought the Services Directive in line with what Parliament had agreed upon. 
127 Council of the European Union, "Common Position adopted by the Council with a view to the adoption 
of a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Services in the Internal Market," 
10003/06, Brussels, 17 July 2006, Article 41. 
128 Ibid., Article 39.5. 
129 Confidential Source, Interview by Author, Brussels, June 26 2006. 
13° Council of the European Union, "Services in the Internal Market: Council Adopts its Common 
Position," 11688/06 (Press 222), Brussels, 24 July 2006. 
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The Council clarified some of the more controversial articles to make sure that 
Parliament's position was in fact respected. 131 
In Parliament, the Common Position was applauded as a breakthrough. Evelyne 
Gedhardt, Parliament's rapporteur on the Services Directive stated that she was "very 
pleased" with the Directive. 132 Malcolm Harbour, speaking for the EPP-ED, stated that 
the Common Position "keeps intact all the core political points that we agreed in 
Parliament."133 Parliament will vote on the Common Position later this fall (2006) and 
unless Parliament agrees on any new major amendments that would require the Directive 
to go back to Council, the Directive will become part of the acquis communautaire. 
131 Ibid. 
132 EU Parliament, "MEP Applaud Breakthrough Agreement on Services," 29 May 2006. Available on the 
World Wide Web at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/expert/infopress _page/049-8533-149-05-22-909-
20060530IPR08532-29-05-2006-2006-false/default fi.htm. 
133 Ibid. -
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Chapter 5 Explaining Policy Output in the EU 
5.1 The Advocacy Coalition Framework 
The Advocacy Coalition Framework developed by Paul Sabatier "views policy 
change over time as a function of three sets of factors." 134 First, policy change results 
from the interaction between competing advocacy coalitions operating in a policy 
subsystem. When applied to the EU we find numerous policy subsystems that have 
developed around EU policy fields, especially in the internal market. 135 Policy 
subsystems can be analyzed by distinguishing advocacy coalitions within the subsystem 
that consist "of actors from many public and private organizations at all levels of 
government who share a set of basic beliefs ... who seek to manipulate the rules of various 
governmental institutions to achieve those goals over time."136 Advocacy coalitions use 
guidance instruments to tum their beliefs into policy, "such as rules, budgets, personnel 
or information."137 The interaction between competing advocacy coalitions produces 
conflict which "is mediated by policy brokers ... .i.e. actors more concerned with system 
stability than with achieving policy itself."138 In the case of the EU policy brokers are 
Member States which through Council ultimate decide the policy direction ofthe EU. 
The essence of the "Common Position' is political and it is a policy compromise. 
Member States must broker their own conflicting policy objectives and those ofEU 
134 Paul Sabatier, "Toward Better Theories of the Policy Process," Political Science and Politics 24, (1991 ): 
147-156, 152. Paul Sabatier, "An Advocacy Coalition Framework of Policy Change and the Role of Policy-
oriented Learning Therein," Policy Sciences 21, (1988): 129-168. Paul Sabatier, "The Advocacy Coalition 
Framework: Revisions and Relevance for Europe," Journal of European Public Policy 5(1), (1998):98-130. 
135 For example, policy subsystems exist for telecommunications, banking, etc. 
136 Paul Sabatier, "Toward Better Theories of the Policy Process," 152-153. 
137 Paul Sabatier, "An Advocacy Coalition Framework of Policy Change and the Role of Policy-oriented 
Learning Therein," 104. 
138 Paul Sabatier, "Toward Better Theories of the Policy Process," 152. 
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institutions and stakeholders. Second, policy change is affected by factors external to the 
subsystem, such as "socioeconomic conditions, system-wide governing coalitions, and 
decisions from other policy subsystems."139 In the case of services in the EU this is 
particularly relevant because changes in the global economy created the pressure to 
liberalize the service sector in the EU. Third, policy change results from the effects of 
stable system parameters, "such as basic social structure and constitutional rules--on the 
constraints and resources of various actors."140 In other words, coalitions use institutional 
avenues available to them to affect policy outcomes. 
Sabatier's ACF rests on the premise that policy change occurs over time. Also, it 
views policy change as a complicated process that involves processes and coalitions both 
inside and outside government. The ACF assumes that within policy subsystems, 
coalitions form around belief systems "such as the proper scope of governmental vs. 
market activity and the proper distribution of authority among levels of government."141 
The ACF is a useful theoretical framework for explaining policy change in the EU 
because it captures the complex policy process that exists in the EU. As opposed to 
explanations of policy change that rely on structural economic reasoning i.e. 'the 
constrained-state theory', the ACF approach accounts for systemic macroeconomic 
pressures but recognizes that different policy positions form within states and in 
supranational economic institutions in response to these pressures. It is the political 
process in which competing policy coalitions operate in that ultimately determines policy, 
not systemic macroeconomic pressure. 
139 Ibid., 153. 
140 Ibid. 
141 Paul Sabatier, "An Advocacy Coalition Framework of Policy Change and the Role of Policy-oriented 
Learning Therein," 13 2. 
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5.2 The Services Policy Subsystem (Table 1.) 
The Services Policy Subsystem consists of what could be called the Single-
Market Coalition and the Socio-cultural Coalition. These coalitions of 'likeminded' 
individuals and groups took advantage of the institutional avenues available to them to 
try and tum their beliefs about services into policy in the EU (see Table 1.). The 
Commission was able through its power to shape and initiate policy to introduce a 
comprehensive proposal for a Services Directive that reflected the policy beliefs of the 
Single Market Coalition. The Socio-cultural Coalition was able to influence the direction 
of services policy, and ultimately tum its core beliefs into policy, by taking advantage of 
the institution in the EU must responsive to public sentiment, Parliament. The Single 
Market Coalition focused its efforts on Parliament which responded by adopting a 
radically different Services Directive than that proposed by the Commission. Member 
States, acting as brokers, had little choice but accept the position adopted by Parliament 
because the position adopted by the Socio-cultural Coalition was politically viable in 
domestic political arenas. 
Table 1. The Service Policy Subsystem 
Single Market Coalition 
Belief System 
Deep Core Beliefs: The promotion and protection 
of the four fundamental freedoms. Liberalization 
is understood in terms of negative integration, 
meaning that liberalization involves the removal 
of barriers to the movement and establishment 
of services in the internal market. 
Policy Core Beliefs: The core assumption is that the 
liberalization of services is guaranteed by the Treaty 
and, therefore, service providers should not be subject 
to different rules and regulatory regimes in different 
countries. The same principle that applies to goods 
should apply to services, or Community-wide 
codes of conduct and regulations need to be 
developed. In any case legal certainty is needed to 
create a foundation to further service liberalization. 
Secondary Aspects: Understand that service 
liberalization will likely be slow given the political 
and economic difficulties associated with liberalizing 
services. 
Actors: The Commission and the ECJ are primary 
actors. Liberal economic think tanks, and business 
oriented organizations and associations (Copenhagen 
Economics, OECD, UNICE). 
Institutional Avenues: The Commission plays 
a substantial role in shaping and initiating EU policy. 
The ECJ interprets the Treaty and works with the 
Commission to guard the EU's legal framework. 
5.2.1 Single Market Coalition 
Socio-cultural Coalition 
Belief System 
Deep Core Beliefs: The promotion and protection 
of national economic traditions and practices. 
Liberalization is understood in terms of positive 
integration that strikes a balance between 
economic integration and the protection of national 
economic traditions that are culturally rooted. 
Policy Core Beliefs: Service Liberalization is 
guaranteed by the Treaty, but that does not mean 
that service providers should be free to operate 
without abiding by national regulations and rules 
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in the Member State they are providing a service. 
Regulatory regimes protect national economic 
traditions and practices. To allow service providers 
to operate outside national rules is not liberalization 
it is unfair competition. 
Secondary Aspects: Understand that service 
liberalization is needed but are unwilling to accept 
liberalization as understood by the single market 
coalition. Prefer a slow gradual process of 
liberalization that respects national realities. 
Actors: EU Committees (ESC, COR), left leaning 
think tanks and social organizations ( ETUC, ESP). 
Institutional Avenues: Parliament, Member States, 
EU Officials. 
The Single-Market Coalition led by the Commission, put the issue of service 
liberalization on the policy agenda in the EU in response to changing global economic 
realities. The Commission's proposal for a Services Directive reflected the core belief of 
the Single-Market coalition; that the EC Treaty guarantees the free movement and 
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establishment of service providers throughout the EU, therefore every Member State has 
a legal obligation to allow service providers from outside their territory operate in their 
country without burdensome regulatory requirements. The Commissions initial proposal 
was comprehensive and included the controversial 'country of origin principle'. The 
Commission used its power within the EU institutional structure to both place services on 
the policy agenda, and to introduce a draft Services Directive that reflected its 
membership in the Single Market Coalition. The problem was that the Commission did 
not anticipate that it would only receive support from a small number of Member States. 
The Single Market Coalition only received unanimous support from the United Kingdom 
and partial support from new Member States. 
The explanation for why the UK supported the Single Market Coalition can be 
found in the nature of the services sector of the British economy. Considering that the UK 
economy is a service based economy that would stand to benefit dramatically from easier 
access to the EU market in services, it is not surprising it supported the Single Market 
Coalition. The UK's economy is already open to service providers established in other 
Member States. The UK is the only Member State in the EU with low barriers to entry in 
the large service sectors of the economy. The UK ranks near the bottom in terms of 
barriers to entry in the following service sectors in the Internal Market: banking, 
accounting, legal services, telecommunications, architecture, distribution, engineering, 
and maritime services. 142 In the context of the EU, the UK has fought attempt to regulate 
the working of the UK's economy. Most notably, the UK intensely fought the infamous 
Working Time Directive which tried to apply uniform working time rules across the 
142 Copenhagen Economics, 77. 
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EU. 143 Since the days of Thatcher, the UK has moved closer and closer towards the 
neoliberal model. This is why the UK often challenges Directives from Brussels that try 
to interfere with the British economy and why they support directives, such as the 
Services Directive, which are based on the logic of neoliberal economics. 
This means that a complete liberalization of the services sector in the EU was a 
politically viable option in the UK because, to a large extent, it already existed between 
the UK and other Member States. It comes as no surprise that the United Kingdom has 
continuously expressed support for the liberalization of services in the EU. It supported 
the first draft of the Services Directive and continued to express support for the 
liberalization of services throughout the period of political turmoil which erupted after 
the Commission issued the first proposal for a Services Directive. 
The UK listed services as one of its priorities when it took over the EU 
Presidency on July 1, 2005: "Free movement of services was foreseen in the original 
Treaty of Rome. Realizing this is a crucial next step for the Single Market, vital for 
growth and jobs, the UK Presidency will take forward discussion with a view to resolving 
the political and social concerns about the Directive."144 The UK Presidency did not 
avoid the issue even though it was controversial. Instead, it used the Presidency to push 
the issue forward and facilitate avenues of dialogue and discussion. 
However, like all Member States the UK did not anticipate the strong negative 
reaction to the Commission's initial proposal for a Services Directive that emerged across 
Europe. In response the UK adopted a pragmatic approach, recognizing that the Directive 
143 Jeff Loder, "Globalization and the State: A Case Study of Policy Convergence," Honors Dissertation 
(B.A.), Memorial University ofNewfoundland, 2005. 
144 UK Presidency of The EU. Available on he World Wide Web: 
http:/ /www.eu2005 .gov. uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid= 1079 
979819948&a=KArticle&aid= 1119516697365#. 
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was not politically viable in the context of the EU in the form presented by the 
Commission. The compromise reached by Parliament was accepted by the UK as the best 
possible political compromise. In other words, it was better to have a Services Directive 
in the form agreed upon by Parliament than no Services Directive at all. There are two 
reasons for this. First, the UK believes that any agreement considering the controversy 
surrounding the issue, will act as a symbol that progress can be made in this area. Second, 
the current text will deliver substantial benefits for the UK services sector. There was 
evidence to suggest that the 'country of origin principle' only accounted for a small 
portion of the potential benefits the UK would receive if services sector was liberalized. 
Therefore, the removal of this principle did not really affect the UK's reasoning for 
supporting a directive for services in the first place. 145 
In response to what can only be termed a defeat, the Single Market Coalition (led 
by the Commission) has taken the view that what is important is the symbolic statement 
made by Services Directive; that progress can be made, which will hopefully lead to a 
truly liberal internal market for services in the future. 146 However, this is a very 
optimistic view considering that it has taken almost fifty years to get Member States to 
agree with the principle agreed upon by the original six members of the EU in 1957. 
5.2.2 Socio-cultural Coalition 
The core belief of the Socio-cultural Coalition is that service liberalization must 
respect national economic traditions and practices. The Socio-cultural Coalition argued 
that by allowing service providers to operate without being subject to the same regulatory 
145 Confidential Source, Interview by Author, Brussels, June 26 2006. 
146 Mauro Miranda, Interview by Author, Commission European Union: Internal market and Services, 23 
June 2006. 
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procedures to which established service providers are subject, they are given an unfair 
advantage in the market place. The Socio-cultural Coalition is not opposed to 
liberalization as they understand it. Service providers should be free to move throughout 
the internal market. However, any EU regulatory regime for services must respect and 
protect national economic practices and traditions. The Socio-cultural Coalition received 
considerably more support than the Single Market Coalition form Member States after 
the Commission released its initial proposal for a Services Directive. France, Germany 
and Belgium, amongst others, began supporting the Socio-cultural Coalition once they 
realized the Commission's proposal was not politically viable in domestic political 
arenas. At this point, they accepted the view that when national economies are opened up 
to outside service providers, unfair competition is created; the logic is that it takes a lot of 
time and money to start a business in any country, especially highly regulated economies 
like Germany. Why should any service provider be excluded from having to go through 
the steps required to operate a business when this requires money and time. Moreover, 
Member States will lose the ability to make sure that services are provided at an 
appropriate standard. Of course, the key question is whether France and Germany 
understood what the Commission was up to, or did understand but wanted to see what 
type of reaction would occur in response to the Commission's proposal. According to 
Charis Xirouchakis, Director of Communications for the Council Secretariat, only the 
Commission understood the economic logic and consequences ofliberalizing services in 
the EU prior to the release of its initial proposal for a Services Directive. 147 However, it is 
equally plausible that a majority of Member States did indeed want to support the single 
147 Charis Xirouchakis, Interview by Author, Commission European Union: Internal market and Services, 
28 June 2006. 
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market coalition, however they had to be sure that domestically, it was a politically viable 
option. When they realized it was not, their support swung over to the socio-cultural 
coalition which ultimately was victorious. 
France was the first and arguably most important Member State along with 
Germany to oppose the Commission's original proposal for a Services Directive. In 
France, the issue of the Services Directive became entangled with the debate over the EU 
Constitution. The Services Directive had become fuel for the 'no side' in the 
constitutional referendum debate in France. After protests in Brussels support for the 'no 
side' in France increased. 148 The 'no side' argued that the Services Directive would 
destroy the European social model. Indeed, French resistance to the Services Directive 
was growing rapidly, even from within the French Government. 149 The pressure forced 
President Chirac to call for a complete review of the Services Directive. Officially, the 
reason was that there was a possibility that the Services Directive could facilitate social, 
fiscal and regulatory dumping. 150 Unofficially, it was clear Chirac was willing to sacrifice 
the Services Directive if it meant victory in the referendum scheduled for the summer of 
2005. During the Spring Council in March 2005, France gained the support of Germany, 
Belgium and Sweden in its effort to have the Services Directive revisited. Swedish Prime 
Minister Goeran Persson stated that "there is agreement to have a far reaching revision of 
the proposal which is in line with the social European model." 151 Consequently, as the 
148 EXPATICA, "French 'non' Drives EU to Revise Services Plan," Published March 22 2005. Available 
on the World Wide Web At: www.expatica.com/source/site 
149 EIROnline, "French Social Partners Respond to EU draft services Directive," Available on the World 
Wide Web at: http://www.eiro.eurofound.eu.int/2005/03/feature/fr05031 05f.html 
150 EurActiv, "France Wants Full Review of Services Directive," Published 3 February 2005. Available on 
the World Wide Web at: http:/ /www.euractiv.com/ Article?tcmuri=tcm:29-134994-16&type=news 
151 Henrietta Billings, "Brussels Confirms EU Services Directive Shake-up," EUPolitix.Com, Published 3 
March 2005. Available on the World Wide Web at: http://www.eupolitix.com/EN/News/200503/f0acb30e-
983d-42f5-42f5-8b95-42860c02f646 
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referendum approached, Chirac attacked liberals across Europe claming he had squashed 
the Services Directive. 152 On March 2, 2005, French Prime Minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin 
stated that the Directive was "unacceptable" and added that the French Government 
would "take every measure to oppose [it]."153 
Similarly in Germany, it was perceived that the Commission's proposal would 
threaten the German tradition of high standards of quality because the state would lose 
the power to regulate the delivery of services. 154 Germany has a strong attachment to its 
system of professional qualifications which is buttressed by powerful trade unions. The 
media which focused on the controversial country of origin principle fed growing fears 
that the country of origin principle would destroy Germany's tradition of high quality of 
standards. 
The core beliefs of the Socio-cultural Coalition were transposed into EU policy. 
The Socio-cultural Coalition was able to gain the support of more brokers than the Single 
Market Coalition because it was able to demonstrate in Parliament that a majority of EU 
citizens supported their position. Consequently, it became obvious to a majority of 
Member States that they could not support the policy position of the Single Market 
Coalition because it was not a politically viable option domestically. 
152 Guardian Unlimited, "Chin~c Takes Aim at EU Liberals in Race to Win Yes Vote," Published 24 March 
2005. Available on the World Wide Web at: politics.guardian.co.uk/eu/story/0,9061,1444589,00.html 
153 Henrietta Billings. 
154 Mauro Miranda, Interview by Author, Commission European Union: Internal market and Services, 23 
June 2006 
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Conclusion 
The evidence presented in this thesis contradicts the claim that globalization 
reduces the "importance of institutions and place."155 The Service Directive will not 
encourage convergence around a single neoliberal economic model in the EU. In fact, the 
Services Directive will have little effect on the overall direction and nature of national 
economies. Member States have retained the power to regulate the service industry on 
their territory. The effect of reducing the scope of the Services Directive and leaving 
regulatory power with Member States is that national economic traditions and differences 
will not be drastically affected. For sure, service providers in the EU will in all likelihood 
extend their scope of operation to other Member States. However, they will largely be 
playing by the rules of the Member State in which they are providing a service. 
Despite what seemed like an unstoppable movement towards liberalization ten 
years ago, little progress has been made towards achieving a truly open market in 
services in the EU. The Services Directive which will likely receive enough votes in 
Parliament the fall of 2006, only provides legal certainty that service providers can 
operate outside their country of origin. It will not dramatically change the ability of 
Member States to control the delivery of services on their territory. Moreover, it will not 
restrict the power of Member States to designate particular service sectors as services of 
'general economic interest' or as 'services of general interest', which will provide states 
with the ability to completely direct the way services designated 
155 Weiss, The Myth of the Powerless State, 42. 
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In the case of the regulation of services, Member States are not simply 'just one 
source of authority among several, with limited power and resources."156 For sure, EU 
institutions will play a role in some service sectors that Member States have agreed are 
better regulated on an EU wide scale. However, states are still the dominant source of 
economic power when it comes to services in the EU. Domestic political and economic 
realities will ultimately determine the degree to which Member States give up power to 
EU institutions with respect to services. Member States have retained the ability to work 
with domestic stakeholders in the service sector to coordinate economic growth. 
Considering that service oriented jobs contribute more to GDP in developed countries 
than any other type of employment, Member States will continue to play a important role 
in determining 'who gets what'. States will still be able to provide aid in service sectors 
of the economy which contradicts what the Commission and Member States originally 
agreed was the primary goal of the Services Directive. 
The empirical evidence presented in this thesis also contradicts conventional 
wisdom that states will eventually be replaced by regional supranational economic 
institutions that pull member states towards a single economic model. We may see more 
regional economic supranational institutions. However, the evidence presented in this 
thesis suggests that if supranational institutions develop into confederal economic 
organizations that include democratic institutions (like Parliament in the EU), 
institutional avenues are created through which the economic power of Member States 
can be protected. This is exactly what happened in the EU. Because Parliament has co-
decision legislative power over the internal market, the Socio-cultural Coalition was able 
to protect Member State authority over services. 
156 Strange, 72. 
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Parliament became the institutional avenue on which the Socio-cultural Coalition 
focused its efforts. Interestingly, it was in Parliament that Member State power over the 
regulation of the services sector was largely protected. Although Member States 
themselves have no control over Parliament, it was the actions and efforts of stakeholders 
in the Socio-cultural Coalition, acting in concert to oppose the Commission's proposal, 
which ultimately reinforced the significance of borders between Member States. The 
irony of the situation is that it would appear that when it comes to protecting the power of 
Member States, stakeholders in the EU organize and operate as if the EU was truly 
borderless. 
If Parliament's role in shaping EU policy increases, there is the possibility that the 
pace of EU integration will reflect the political compromises which can be reached in 
Parliament. Moreover, enlargement reduces the likelihood that Member States can agree 
to change the Treaty, which means that the policy proposals put forth by Parliament are 
more likely to be viewed as acceptable policy options politically. As the empirical 
evidence presented in this thesis demonstrates, Parliament is the institution in the EU 
most responsive to public sentiment in the EU. Indeed, enlargement reduces the 
probability that Member States will agree to change the Treaty, thereby reducing the 
chance that Member States will simply change the Treaty as opposed to accepting a 
position put forth by Parliament or the Commission. 
By applying the ACF to the case of service liberalization in the EU it becomes 
clear that explaining policy outcomes in the EU requires a theoretical approach that takes 
into account the complex nature of the EU system of governance. Moreover, the ACF 
demonstrated that one can not simply adopt structural economic reasoning to explain 
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policy outcomes. What is required is a theoretical framework that accounts for the 
interaction between macroeconomic pressures and domestic political and economic 
forces. For sure, one can not explain economic policy outcomes by simply looking at the 
domestic situation. Economic globalization may lead to systemic macroeconomic 
pressures that alter the costs associated with adopting a particular policy program over 
another. However, they do not determine national economic policy; this is ultimately 
determined by political processes and governmental institutions. 
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